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Kasper Kepsu
THE UNRULY BUFFER ZONE
The Swedish province of Ingria in the late 17th
century
This article discusses the province of Ingria, part of Sweden from 1617 until 1704, and its
position in the Swedish Kingdom in the late 17th century. The main purpose is to examine
how Sweden implemented its centralization and unification policy in Ingria and what
reactions it triggered at the local level. Court records and other administrative documents
have been used as source material. Ingria was a borderland that was primarily of military
importance for Sweden as a buffer zone against Russia. A strong defence was also essential
in order to secure the profitable Russian transit trade, in which the Ingrian towns of Narva
and Nyen played a pivotal role. Sweden’s centralization and unification policy, which
peaked in the middle of the 1680s, aimed particularly at strengthening its military
presence in Ingria. Resources were obtained by confiscating fiefs and later privatizing the
administration of manors, to be handled by leaseholders. Tax farming resulted in peasant
unrest, and eventually the Crown had to regulate the taxation. Ultimately, the Crown was
not strong enough to carry out a coherent integration policy. Ingria remained a borderland
province that formed a link between the core areas of Sweden and the Baltic provinces.
Keywords Ingria, state formation, integration, tax farming, peasant unrest,
transit trade, borderland
Introduction
The province of Ingria (Sw. Ingermanland), at the far end of the Gulf of Finland, was
ceded to Sweden in the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617 together with Kexholm
County. Nowadays, Ingria has largely been forgotten, which is reflected in the fact that
the name of the former Swedish province has disappeared from modern maps. In the
same manner, most historical research on 17th-century Ingria is insufficient and
outdated.1 However, a considerable amount of original source material has survived.
Hence, this study is largely based on administrative documents, such as court records
and correspondence between the Crown’s officials.
This article examines the position of Ingria in the Swedish Kingdom by concen-
trating on Sweden’s centralization and unification policy regarding Ingria at the end of
the 17th century. The significance of the province is also investigated by discussing
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Ingria as a border region and by analysing commercial developments in Ingria. The
focus is, first, on the Swedish Crown’s aim to unify its provinces and, second, on how
the Ingrian population reacted to such measures. The article sheds new light on state
formation in early modern border regions.
Ingria as a problematic border region
First, it is necessary to discuss Ingria from a geographical standpoint. Ingria was a
relatively problematic border region for Sweden. These kinds of problems, though,
were actually typical of peripheral border regions in early modern Europe.2 However,
just what types of problems did the Swedish Crown face in Ingria in the early modern
period and how did the territory emerge?
Ingria was a part of the Swedish Kingdom from 1617 until 1704, when it was
conquered by Russia (de jure ceded in 1721). While under Swedish rule, Ingria was a
turbulent region with great ethnic and cultural diversity. The population spoke
different languages and consisted of several ethnic groups. The indigenous people,
Izhorians and Votes as well as Russians, professed the Orthodox faith. During the 17th
century, a significant influx of Lutheran Finns from the Karelian Isthmus and Savonia
(Sw. Savolax) changed the ethnic structure of the population. Altogether, the Ingrian
population was characterized by great mobility, which created certain problems for the
authorities. Indeed, authorities continuously ran up against different kinds of problems
in Ingria. Hence, it was often described as a ‘troublesome’ province by the governors-
general.3
Previous research, especially Finnish and Swedish historiography dating back to the
late 19th century, described Ingria in colourful terms. Ingria was, for example, called
the ‘Swedish Siberia’, which is a reference to the social problems caused by extensive
migrations and even deportations to the region, as in Siberia or the American west in
the 19th century. In addition, the inhabitants were more or less depicted as ignorant
barbarians or criminals.4 According to the English scholar Michael Roberts, Ingria was
‘a dumping-ground for undesirables’, who often were ‘turbulent individuals’ avoiding
taxes or contract labour service.5 But were the migrants really deported criminals or
unusually restless individuals, as the rhetoric of the ‘wild east’ suggests?
It is evident that a significant number of migrants moved to Ingria illegally in an
attempt to avoid paying taxes or arrears to the Crown or to avoid conscription or local
conflicts of some kind.6 Crown officials in Ingria had no illusions about the inhabitants
in the province. Governor-General Göran Sperling noted that the people were difficult
to handle and, therefore, needed to be disciplined. He also described the people as
cunning and fierce.7 Indeed, Ingrian peasants used the border in a tactical manner in
order to avoid various obligations to both the Crown and various manors. They
frequently moved to new holdings and benefitted from a system that promised
exemption from taxes during the first three years on a new holding. Desertion was
also common. If the tax burden became too heavy, it was easy to slip over the border
into Russia. The Swedish–Russian border was highly permeable, like many borders
between early modern states. The people in Ingria, Karelia, and eastern Finland were
also used to moving around, mostly because they were accustomed to burn beating.8
Overall, the mobility of the Ingrain population made it very difficult for the authorities
to control the region.
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Nevertheless, most of the migrants were not criminals. The number of
deported individuals was quite low. In fact, the majority of migrants simply sought
an easier way to make a living in a time characterized by heavy tax burdens, a harsh
climate, and indirect religious discrimination. At the same time, many migrants
were surely tempted by the vast amount of uninhabited holdings in Ingria.
Migration to Ingria was intense, especially after the Ingrian War (1610‒1617)
and the Russo-Swedish War (1656–1658), which decimated entire villages in the
region.
Ingria was a borderland, but also a transitional region, characterized by the
gradual movement from one cultural norm to another.9 Actually, Ingria was part
of a more extensive border region, comprising Ingria, Kexholm County, Viborgian
Karelia, and the area of Savonia in eastern Finland. Thus, the entire eastern part of
the Swedish Kingdom shared common features. Here, western and eastern ele-
ments met, most evidently the Lutheran and Greek Orthodox faiths.
Symptomatically, one of the most difficult problems faced by Swedish authorities
in 17th-century Ingria, as well as in Kexholm County, was how to integrate the
Orthodox peasants with the Crown. Throughout the 17th century, the Swedish
Crown tried to convert the Orthodox population to Lutheranism, mostly by
persuasive methods.10 This problem remained an unresolved issue throughout the
period of Swedish rule in Ingria.
Ingria can be described as an unruly borderland, referring to a model developed by
Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel. According to them, the social dynamics of a
border region are dependent upon the mutual power relations between the state, the
local elite, and the common people. Depending on the nature of the power relations,
the borderland can be described as quiet, unruly, or rebellious. Ingria was neither quiet
nor rebellious: on the one hand, the power relations were not coherent, while, on the
other, the common people and local elite did not actively challenge state control
together. The middle category, unruly borderland, is characterized by less coherent
power structures, in which neither the state nor the local elite have established a
commanding position over the local population. The entire region is therefore difficult
to control, and the state often appears weak when it tries to enforce its sovereignty.
Military forces are stationed in the area to enforce state rule.11 This concept describes
the situation in 17th-century Ingria quite well.
In addition, both Charles Tilly and Brian M. Downing have argued that, in
general, the process of state formation was driven by military demands. Because of
international competition, especially war and preparation for war, rulers had to
increasingly extract resources for their armies and navies through a more effective,
centralized, and uniform state apparatus. Consequently, the modern state developed
somewhat as a byproduct.12 As for Ingria, the military aspects of the Swedish
centralization policy are clearly visible: the province was an important buffer zone
for Sweden. Harald Gustafsson has noted that the process of state formation was also
influenced from below. The use of various communicative channels, uprisings, and the
risk of peasant unrest often resulted in compromises.13 This perspective offers a fruitful
approach in the case of Ingria. Moreover, Gustafsson uses the concept of the conglom-
erate state, which can be applied to 17th-century Ingria. As Gustafsson has stated, a
conglomerate state comprised different territories that had varying relationships with
the Crown.14
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The integration of Ingria
The Swedish integration policy for Ingria is a particularly good research topic as the
aims of a central government emerge especially clearly in border regions.15 Thus, it is
essential to examine how the Swedish Crown tried to integrate Ingria into the realm.
Previous studies explained the integration of Ingria in a straightforward manner,
particularly for the years following the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617.
Moreover, this interpretation strongly influenced the image of Swedish Ingria through-
out the entire 17th century. However, was the process that simple?
Ingria was not part of the actual realm (Sw. riket), but was instead governed as a
province. Nonetheless, the rights of Ingria were relatively similar to those of the core
areas, at least when compared to the German (notably Pommern and Bremen-Verden)
and Baltic provinces (Estonia, Livonia, and Ösel). Though the inhabitants of Ingria
were under Swedish law, they were not represented in the Swedish Diet.
Consequently, Ingria belonged to a middle category compared to the other Swedish
provinces.16
Previous studies often claimed that Ingria became integrated with the Swedish
Crown immediately after the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617. When analysing this
process, it is evident that the conclusions of Jerker Rosén influenced earlier research
particularly strongly. According to him, the Crown implemented a policy of unifor-
mity with respect to both judicial administration and the privileges of the nobility
immediately after the Treaty of Stolbova.17 Prior research also suggested that it was
possible to achieve such uniformity because an administrative tradition did not exist in
Ingria. Moreover, the nobility in Ingria was unable to oppose the Swedish central
government when it undertook different kinds of actions in the region after the Treaty
of Stolbova. It has even been argued that Ingria lacked local and judicial administration
and a local elite before 1617.18
However, these arguments are misleading. First, they fail to take the Russian bayors
(ryssbajorer) into consideration. This group consisted of a few Russian noble families who
entered Swedish service during the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the 17th
century. As local elite, the bayors were allocated various intermediary assignments by
the Swedish Crown. In return, they received large land grants and were incorporated
into the Swedish House of Nobility. The Russian bayors were not as powerful as the
Noble Corporations (Ritterschaft) in Estonia (Estland) and Livonia (Livland), but they did
oppose some of the central government’s actions.19 Binding local elites to the state was,
of course, typical for rulers during the early modern period. It was almost impossible for
a centralized power to rule without state servants, who controlled the collection of local
taxes and were familiar with local conditions, particularly in peripheral border regions.20
Second, administration in the Novgorod region of the Muscovite state during the
16th century was in fact relatively well developed.21 Interestingly, local administration
in this area was quite similar to local administration in Sweden. Taxation, however,
was different. It was not fixed; instead, the tax was estimated every year. In addition,
large parts of Ingria were leased during the first years of Swedish rule.22
It is misleading, therefore, to claim that the central government’s actions aimed at
unifying Ingria completely and making it part of the realm. The actions of the Swedish
central government were not particularly resolute or consistent, as its objective was
not to unify the province with the core of Sweden but rather to organize the
administration of Ingria to run as smoothly as possible.23 In fact, the case of Ingria is
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a quite typical example of state formation at the time. Integrative actions were rarely
preceded by well-planned visions; rather, they stemmed from the need for concrete
actions in critical situations.24
Swedish provincial policy towards the eastern Baltic provinces (Ingria, Kexholm
County, Estonia, Livonia, and Ösel) was more or less passive in the middle of the 17th
century.25 In the late 17th century, however, the Crown started to impose more
demands and heavier burdens on the provinces. This was mostly caused by the
desperate financial situation of the Swedish state following the Scanian War
(1675‒1679). At the same time, Charles XI sought to restrict the power of the
Swedish high nobility, who opposed a more integrative provincial policy.26 Similar
integration processes occurred elsewhere in Europe during this period. Competition
between European states forced rulers to centralize and unify their territories because
larger armies and different kinds of military reforms demanded yet more resources. At
the same time, the political situation in Europe was relatively stable, which made it
possible for many states to concentrate on domestic reforms.27
Reduction, tax farming, and the manorial economy
Sweden’s provincial policy towards Ingria in the late 17th century consisted of many
administrative reforms. The reduction of estates, launched in Ingria in 1675, formed
the basis for its integration and centralization policy. It is important to stress that
centralization and unification were not the ultimate goals; instead, they were measures
taken to strengthen Ingria’s financial situation and, above all, to bolster its military
strength. These aspects appear distinctly in the reduction efforts and the initiation of
tax farming and the Ingrian manorial economy, all of which are discussed in this
section.
The reduction of estates (Sw. reduktionen) formed the basis for Sweden’s integration
policy with respect to all its eastern Baltic provinces.28 In Ingria, a commission led by
Commissioner Daniel Tilas began reclaiming the various fiefs for the Crown in 1675. The
most important aim was to improve the military capacity and preparedness of the province,
especially with respect to supplying the fortresses. The commission operated in the
province until 1679. In total, the commission restored approximately one-third of the
cultivated land to the Crown.29 This process was part of the so called fjärdepartsreduktionen
(‘quarter reduction’) and was based on the reduction law of 1655, which stipulated that
certain parts of the donated fiefs should be returned to the Crown.30
The implementation of the fjärdepartsreduktionen was not an easy task for the commission
because the Ingrian nobility had by this point become a powerful force to be reckoned with in
Ingria. The nobility had become more organized when the Ingrian Noble Corporation (Ritter
und Landschafft), including the noblemen from Kexholm County, was founded in 1642. It had
a Baltic-German character and operated in the German language, as the number of noblemen
of Baltic-German descent in Ingria had increased due to the enfeoffment policy adopted by
Queen Christina. During her reign, vast areas of land had been donated as fiefs to officers and
officials. The Ingrian nobility resisted the reduction efforts and sent a deputation to Stockholm
in protest. However, King Charles XI and the central government refused to cancel the
reduction. Instead, they decided to decrease the political power of the Ingrian Noble
Corporation. In the beginning of the 1680s, the Diets (Lantdag) of the Ingrian Noble
Corporation ended.31
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The reduction of 1675 slightly eased the financial situation in Ingria, but it was the
extension of the reduction and the initiation of tax farming that really improved the
economy of the province. In 1680, the Great Reduction was implemented in Sweden.
In 1683, it reached Ingria, and soon after that approximately two-thirds of the land in
Ingria was confiscated by the Crown. This had a great impact on the province’s fiscal
situation.32 Governor-General Sperling informed the king in 1684 that the province
was now able to support itself for the first time.33 In 1695, the land restored to the
Crown provided the province with almost 90,000 dalers (daler silvermynt) in income.
At that point, all of the land belonging to the Crown was leased.34
Instead of creating a tax collection system of its own, the administration of the
manors was privatized and the job assigned to leaseholders (Sw. arrendator). This was
not a new phenomenon in Sweden: during the 1620s and 1630s, tax collection had
been almost entirely privatized.35 The first contracts between the Crown and those
leasing the Crown manors in Ingria were signed in 1677.36 However, the outcome was
still far from clear, as Crown officials and Charles XI debated for almost a decade over
how best to administer the fiefs confiscated by the Crown. Peasant representatives
were also permitted to state their opinion. The peasants were very clear on one point:
they hoped to get rid of their former landlords and remain under the Crown.37
In addition, taxation was debated. In Ingria, as well as in Kexholm County,
taxation was based on a non-fixed rent (Sw. arvning, Fi. arviovero). The taxable
property and crops of the peasants were assessed annually and the taxes set based on
the results of the assessment. The peasants did not in general like this system, as it
lacked any form of stability. The peasants could not know how much tax they would
have to pay the following year.38 It is worth mentioning that the peasants were
allowed to present their own arguments in various non-institutional negotiations.
Later, Governor-General Sperling discussed in detail the non-fixed rent with the
peasants at different locations in Ingria and Kexholm County.39
Governor Henrik Piper, who was mainly responsible for economic matters,
argued strongly for a solution that would satisfy the peasants, claiming that a fixed
rent was absolutely necessary and that, ultimately, tax farming contracts should be
cancelled. Piper initially had the support of Charles XI, but things changed when
Göran Sperling was appointed governor-general in 1683. Sperling shared Piper’s view
on the need for fixed rent because then the Ingrian people would be more closely
connected to the Swedish Crown. However, Sperling preferred tax farming, in
contrast to Piper. Sperling did not think that the Crown should collect the taxes or
that conscriptions for the army were suitable in Ingria. The issue concerning the
collection of taxes was resolved in 1684, when the Chamber College (Sw.
Kammarkollegiet) ordered that the confiscated manors should be leased. Eventually
Piper was made subordinate to and outmanoeuvred by Sperling, which ended
Piper’s promising career.40 A decade later, when Piper was working as an inspector
at an iron works plant in Dalarna, he still complained about how Sperling had
ruthlessly and relentlessly persecuted him (‘omilda, och hårda förföllielse’).41
Both Henrik Piper and Göran Sperling also argued for other kinds of reforms to be
implemented in Ingria. The reforms aimed at integrating Ingria more closely with the
core of the realm: Sweden and Finland. Piper suggested that, for example, local
sheriffs and constables (Sw. läns- och fjärdingsmän) should work in the local adminis-
tration, as in the core areas.42 Many of the economic reforms suggested by Piper had
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military aims. Carbines and pistols should be manufactured and manors should produce
articles for the fortress garrisons.43 Piper’s proposals strived for more or less total
uniformity, while Sperling did not go that far in his suggestions. Like Piper, he aimed
for integration, but in some respects he argued for arrangements that were more
typical of provinces, with the foremost being tax farming and garrisons manned with
conscripts from the core areas. Sperling’s suggestions were probably more attractive to
the Crown; they did not require as much financial investment as did Piper’s model. It
is important to bear in mind that one of the main goals of Sweden’s provincial policy
was to improve the fiscal situation of the provinces. The central government empha-
sized on many occasions that Ingria had to be financially self-supporting rather than a
fiscal burden for the state.44
The centralization and unification policy in Ingria peaked in the middle of the
1680s. It consisted mainly of administrative reforms in judicial and city administration
as well as a conversion policy targeting the Orthodox population. In addition, the
Ingrian Noble Corporation was suppressed by the Crown. On a symbolic level, every
nobleman, priest, and burgher in Ingria and Kexholm County had to swear an oath of
loyalty to Charles XI in 1688.45 According to the Estonian scholar Jaak Naber, the
Swedish integration and centralization policy in the eastern Baltic provinces began in
Ingria, which became a testing ground for later centralizing efforts taken in Estonia and
Livonia.46
The conversion policy was probably the most characteristic example of Sweden’s
integration policy with respect to Ingria during the 1680s. The desire to achieve
religious uniformity affected primarily the Izhorians and the Votes. They professed the
Orthodox faith, but spoke Finno-Ugrian languages and did not usually understand
Russian. Superintendent Johannes Gezelius and Governor-General Sperling initiated
measures to segregate this group of people from the Orthodox Church. According to
Gezelius, the Izhorians and the Votes were not ‘true Russians’ (rätte Ryssar) and had to
be converted to Lutheranism.47 However, the conversion policy led to protests among
the Orthodox population. In addition, the tsar of Russia sent a note to Charles XI in
August 1685 demanding he put a stop to such religious persecution. Consequently,
Gezelius and Sperling had to ease up on the policy. Mika Sivonen concludes that the
conversion policy can be described as a form of indirect discrimination; but it did not
in the end destroy the Orthodox tradition.48
The actual aims of Sweden’s provincial policy in the late 17th century have been
discussed in previous studies. Jonas Nordin emphasizes cultural homogenization as an
important means of promoting uniformity. Nordin, as well as Jerker Rosén and Stellan
Dahlgren, stresses that the aim of integrating the provinces into the actual realm was
implemented as a conscious effort.49 Aleksander Loit has also called attention to the
integration aspect of Sweden’s provincial policy and even suggested that the relation
between the Crown and the eastern Baltic provinces included colonial elements.50
Torbjörn Eng, in turn, has claimed that only political, administrative, and judicial
homogenization were relevant at the time. However, the conglomerate state as a form
of state was ultimately too weak to carry out such a demanding task.51 Kimmo
Katajala, as well as Nils Erik Villstrand, has pointed out that there were considerable
differences in how the provinces were governed, with the method varying on a case-
by-case basis. In addition, Katajala has shown that the issue of creating cultural
uniformity was not so simple. Regarding Kexholm County and Ingria, the migration
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of Lutheran Finns and the decision to subordinate Ingria to the Court of Appeal in Åbo
(Turku) were both measures aimed at integrating Ingria more closely with Finland and,
thereby, with the core of Sweden. Therefore, Finnification actually meant
Swedification from the central government’s viewpoint.52
In the case of Ingria, it is evident that the Crown strove to a degree for cultural
uniformity, at least for confessional uniformity. In 1685, Charles XI was generally
pleased that most issues in the province were being implemented according to
‘Swedish manners’ (Swenskt bruuk och maneer).53 Likewise, administrative and judicial
uniformity were on the agenda. However, the process was quite problematic. In many
respects, Ingria still differed from the core territories of the Swedish Kingdom and was
governed by methods typical of the eastern Baltic provinces.54 It is also important to
bear in mind that an integration process was put into practice throughout the Swedish
Kingdom in the late 17th century.55
The military aspects of Sweden’s provincial policy are of crucial importance, and
clearly demonstrated in the correspondence of the Ingrian governors. The governors
constantly emphasized the need to strengthen the fortresses and garrisons as Ingria was
a border province and served as a buffer zone.56 After all, Sweden’s defensive strategy
in the eastern Baltic provinces relied on strong fortresses.57 However, Ingria’s
fortresses were in a state of disrepair and out of date at the beginning of the 1680s.
In 1681, the Swedish fortification specialist Erik Dahlberg observed that both Narva
and Nyen (Nyenskans, Fi. Nevanlinna) were in very bad condition.58
Military arguments were explicitly made in relation to the reduction and the
initiation of tax farming. The reduction order of 1675 stated that the income should be
used to supply the fortresses and the troops stationed there.59 In a border region like
Ingria, it is evident that resources were supposed to serve the purposes of war or the
preparation for war.60 In other words, this confirms the arguments of Charles Tilly,
Brian M. Downing, and Harald Gustafsson, among others, that the process of state
formation was mostly driven by military demands.
The reduction and the initiation of tax farming meant that the Crown decided to
rely on a manorial economy in order to extract monies earmarked mostly for military
needs. Thus, the leaseholders were responsible for the collection of taxes and, in a
way, functioned as the acting authority for the Crown. Most of the leaseholders were
officers, civil officials, or former bailiffs.61 Ingria was the first province in the Swedish
Kingdom in which tax farming was initiated; later, Kexholm County, Estonia, Ösel,
and Livonia followed. Besides the eastern Baltic provinces, though, tax farming was
not implemented in other parts of the Swedish Kingdom.62
The changes made in the agrarian system in the 1670s and 1680s resulted in a
somewhat original manorial economy in Ingria. During the last decades of Swedish
rule, the number of manors (called in Sw. hov, Ge. hof or Fi. hovi in Ingria) and
leaseholders increased and, all in all, the manorial economy became more intensive.63
The manorial system in Ingria represents a mixture of the concepts of Grundherrschaft
and Gutsherrschaft (demesne lordship), which are often used as a theoretical framework
when researching manorial economic systems.64 In Ingria, the fields of the manors
were cultivated by peasants obligated to perform statute labour, which characterizes
Gutsherrschaft. However, the economy of the manors still relied on rents paid by the
peasants, which was typical of Grundherrschaft. In addition, the landlords and tax
farmers had no judicial power over the peasants. The activities of leaseholders were
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regulated by the leasing contracts, even though the Crown could not control the tax
farmers completely. Though the work done by the peasants was extensively controlled
by the manors, they were not serfs. Swedish law forbade this.65
An interesting issue in the Ingrian manorial economy is the position of the
manorial officials and the degree to which they used violence against their tenants.
The role of the manorial officials in the manorial economy and in the relations
between peasants and authorities in general has often been overlooked.66 Still, they
played a key role in the manorial economy, as most of the landlords and some of the
leaseholders did not reside on their manors. The manorial officials in Ingria consisted
of three groups: inspectors (called inspector or hopman), bailiffs (amtman) and super-
visors of a lower rank (kubias or solvanek). They represented a kind of intermediary
lordship
(Ge. Vermittelte Herrschaft), standing somewhere between a superior and a subordinate.
The German scholar Otto Ulbricht has emphasized that the bailiffs handled most of
the interactions between the manor and peasants, especially in periods of crisis.67
For manorial officials, it was of the utmost importance to maintain strong
authority over the peasants.68 Still, the officials faced many challenges when balancing
between different loyalties. Conflicts arose especially with respect to labour service.
The peasants were not highly motivated to perform statute labour, and therefore the
officials often had to resort to violence, which was allowed to a certain degree.
Domestic discipline (Sw. husaga, Ge. Hauszucht) was used in Ingria in a similar manner
as in other Baltic provinces. When peasants were treated violently, contemporary
people spoke of the ‘Livonian practice’ (livländskt sätt) of exercising domestic disci-
pline. In saying this, they were referring to the arbitrary methods often used by lords
and superior manorial officials in Estonia and Livonia, who mostly were of Baltic-
German descent (livländare).69
The Baltic-Germans have been judged harshly in the historiographical literature.
Historians have written about the ‘brutal rule of the German nobles in the Baltic
provinces’ and even called them ‘a gang of robber barons’.70 It is evident that fief
holders in Ingria aspired to control their peasants in a similar manner to the nobility in
Estonia and Livonia. Landlords were primarily irritated by deserting peasants and the
mobility of the Ingrian population in general. Officials working for the central
government could, however, prevent the attempts of the Ingrian nobility to increase
their power over the peasants. In fact, the Swedish authorities regarded the ‘Livonian
practice’ as a threat, especially the severe domestic discipline meted out via corporal
punishment.71 During Charles XI’s integration policy, criticism of the ‘Livonian
practice’ increased, and the Crown implemented many reforms in the eastern Baltic
provinces aimed at improving the position of the peasants, even though serfdom itself
was not abolished.72
Interestingly, the peasants shared the fear of the Swedish Crown. In 1686, Ingrian
peasants complained to the king that they were being treated in a ‘Livonian practice’.73
It is, however, important to bear in mind that the ‘Livonian practice’ of treatment did
not necessarily refer to the landlords’ ethnic origin, but rather to the unregulated
arbitrary methods of coercion used in the manorial economy. Prior studies have found
that many landlords and manorial officials of Swedish origin adopted the ‘Livonian
pratice’.74 This was also the case in Ingria, where the majority of the tax farmers and
manorial officials were of Swedish or Finnish origin.75
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The reduction, and especially the initiation of tax farming, resulted in some
changes in the manorial economy. The manorial economy became more intensive
and control increased at the local level. From the Crown’s perspective, the aim was
above all to improve the fiscal-military situation in the province. According to Ingrian
account books (Sw. guvernementsböcker), military expenditures increased tremendously
after the reduction, notably with respect to fortifications.76 The transition to tax
farming can be seen as a centralizing measure of the Crown, as resources were
mobilized to benefit the manorial economy using tax farmers. Consequently, the
centralization policy in Ingria was partly implemented through decentralization.
Peasant unrest
The people of Ingria reacted quite strongly to the effects of the centralization and
unification policy. During the 1680s, there were numerous quarrels between peasants
and Crown leaseholders, which the authorities investigated thoroughly. Moreover, the
Orthodox population protested against the conversion policy. But could the peasants
affect the integration measures initiated by the Swedish Crown, and what was the
attitude of the authorities towards the peasant resistance? In short, what was the
relationship between peasants and authorities in Ingria?
For the peasants, the reduction did not provide any relief, as the authorities
became more visible than before. Tax farmers controlled their subordinated peasants
more firmly and had an interest in collecting the taxes as stringently as possible;
otherwise, their own economy would be at risk. After all, the tax farmers’ living was
dependent upon the surplus received after paying the fixed annual sum collected from
the peasants to the Crown.77
Before the troublesome period of the 1680s, at least a few quarrels did occur on
Ingrian manors. Unfortunately, not much is known about these earlier quarrels
because, first, peasant unrest in Ingria has not received much scholarly attention
and, second, the court records from Ingria have survived only from the year 1684
onwards. It seems, however, that unrest occurred almost immediately after the
fjärdepartsreduktionen was launched in 1675. Not all of the quarrels took place on
Crown manors. Interestingly, relations between peasants and authorities were also
tense in some fiefs.78
One of the most dramatic struggles took place on the Orboina manor in Koporje
County, a fief administered by Lieutenant Gustaf Casimir von Spankow (Spandekow).
The quarrel between Spankow and the peasants of Holopovitsa village was caused by a
boundary dispute, which had been going on since at least 1668.79 In the spring of
1682, the quarrel escalated to become a minor riot. Apparently, the peasants of
Holopovitsa had been gathering hay and chopping wood on a disputed piece of land.
Spankow responded by confiscating the villagers’ cattle. Soon afterwards, the peasants,
armed with guns, axes, and spears, liberated their cattle by force. During the riot,
Spankow was struck on the shoulder with an axe, while his servant fired some shots at
the peasants.80
After the riot, the quarrel continued for approximately five years. The case sheds
light on many aspects of peasant unrest. The dispute was complicated precisely because
the power structures at the local level were complex. The important role played by
the manorial officials is clearly visible. The peasants of Holopovitsa were more or less
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defended by their bailiff (amtman), Henrik Orduska, which irritated both Spankow and
Orduska’s superior, Inspector and Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Skantzenstierna. The
court case also sheds light on how the ‘Livonian practice’ appeared in Ingria. Many
peasants provided testimony in court of Spankow’s arbitrariness. According to the
peasants, Spankow had beaten many of them. In addition, he had confiscated wood,
hay, tools, and livestock, he had shot cows and one dog, and had tied some peasants up
and hung them from the wall in handcuffs. Spankow used some of these methods to
find out which of the peasants had attacked him during the riot. The court also tried to
ascertain just who had participated in the riot. Ultimately, the peasants revealed the
names of the participants together with bailiff Orduska, showing a good sense of
tactical awareness. They blamed the peasant Tuomas Makkonen (Thomas Mackoin) for
everything. The peasants of Holopovitsa attested to the fact that Makkonen had
persuaded the others to free the cattle by force. For the peasants, Makkonen was a
suitable scapegoat as he had already fled Ingria.81 The measures adopted by the
peasants in court are a clear example of how the peasants took advantage of the
location of the province near the border.
Regarding peasant resistance on leased Crown manors in Ingria, the so-called
‘Töllikkö trouble’ (Töllikes oväsende) must also be mentioned. The aged peasant Yrjö
Töllikkö (Jören Töllickö) was one of most active peasant leaders in the mid-1680s.
Töllikkö initially submitted a complaint to Governor-General Sperling in 1684, in
Narva, complaining about inspector Lars Gamberg, who leased Putila (Putilova) manor
in Loppis pogost, in Nöteborg County. When the complaint came to nothing, Töllikkö
decided to complain to the king. He submitted a letter of grievance to the king in the
autumn of 1685, in Stockholm. The complaint was written on behalf of all the peasants
of Nöteborg County. The peasants complained about the arbitrary methods of
Inspector Gamberg and others, indicating that the local officials likewise did not do
justice to them. The peasants begged for help and support from the king and requested
that a fixed rent be implemented. This time the Crown ordered a thorough investiga-
tion by the district court in Nöteborg County.82
The complaints submitted by Yrjö Töllikkö were investigated in 1686. During the
court case, Töllikkö revealed that he had talked with other members of the peasantry
on many occasions, for example after performing service for the church, about the
importance of obtaining a fixed rent. The court case also included numerous dramatic
incidents. After one of the sessions in court, Töllikkö was stabbed by a drunk
Gamberg. The wound was not serious, but the incident caused disorder among the
peasants. Ultimately, Töllikkö was sentenced to run the gauntlet, and thereafter, to
exile in Courland (in present-day Latvia) for issuing complaints that could not be
proved and for instigating the people to revolt. The sentence did not, however,
discourage Töllikkö. Instead, he returned to Ingria in the summer of 1687, apparently
accompanied by many peasants along the road from Narva to Nyen. Shortly thereafter,
Töllikkö once again travelled to Stockholm to complain in person. However, this is
where the sources fall silent. It is unlikely that he ever returned to Ingria.83
In addition to the complaints submitted by Yrjö Töllikkö, a great number of other
complaints from Ingria were handed to the authorities in the mid-1680s, mostly to the
governor-general in Narva. Usually the peasants complained about their leaseholders,
although the Orthodox population also protested against the conversion policy. In
addition to Töllikkö, the most important peasant leaders were the assistant vicar
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Matthias Moisander and his sidekick, Huotari, who was an Orthodox peasant. They
mostly protested against the conversion policy, but also against the arbitrariness of the
tax farmers and the non-fixed rent.84 Interestingly, even though Moisander was a
Lutheran vicar, he devoted himself to the cause of the Orthodox peasants. In the
autumn of 1686, Moisander and Huotari submitted an extensive complaint to the king
in Stockholm. The complaint consisted of 31 paragraphs and was signed by 181
peasants.85
The numerous complaints from Ingria upset Governor-General Sperling. Charles
XI required an explanation for the continuous criticism. The king also recommended
that Sperling put a stop to the peasants being treated like slaves. Sperling admitted that
some leaseholders had treated their peasants in the ‘Livonian practice’, but at the same
time he labelled Moisander an agitator and the peasants disrespectful. However, the
governor-general suggested that a commission should investigate the complaints.86 A
commission finally arrived in Ingria in the autumn of 1688 and dealt with a great
number of complaints. After this, the situation in Ingria seemingly calmed down, even
though conflicts on Ingrian manors still occurred. Another reason for the relative calm
was that Huotari and Matthias Moisander were sentenced by the king to lifetime
imprisonment and forced labour on Ingrian fortresses. In addition, Governor-General
Sperling proclaimed in the summer of 1686 that the annually assessed non-fixed rent
was to be abolished.87
Thus, the countermeasures taken by the Crown were partly repressive, but at the
same time the Crown made some concessions to the peasants. After a thorough
investigation, the authorities implemented a kind of fixed tax, even though the most
important leaders were convicted and given heavy sentences. This kind of ambivalence
was typical of the Swedish central authorities, who were equally contradictory in their
reactions to peasant unrest in the core areas of the Swedish realm.
When analysing the resistance in Ingria, it is evident that peasants used both legal
and illegal methods when trying to obtain a fixed rent and to do away with the tax
farming system. One typical legal method was to write complaints. However, there
were many forms of illegal resistance, ranging from collective strikes to violent assaults
and even minor riots. Yet the most common form of illegal resistance was passive
protest. Typically, peasants mixed legal and illegal forms of resistance, for example by
simultaneously submitting complaints and relying on passive protest.
The relationship between peasants and authorities in Ingria can, in turn, be
analysed within the framework of the long-standing point of debate in Nordic
historiography as to whether early modern peasant society was suppressed by the
state machinery or whether it can be characterized as an interactive process.88 The
situation in Ingria demonstrates that bargaining was an essential part of the political
culture in the Swedish provinces. Crown officials negotiated with the peasants and took
their opinions into account. The protests also led to some positive results for the
peasants. It is, however, evident that the state always had the upper hand.89 The
military aspect should be further emphasized. The Swedish military state was, above
all, organized to supply the army and the navy.90 To acquire the necessary resources,
however, the state had to bargain with its subjects.
When further analysing the political culture of Ingria, it should be noted that there
nevertheless were some significant differences compared to the situation in the actual
realm. As the Ingrian peasants did not have access to the Diet, interaction between the
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peasants and the authorities relied to a greater degree on temporary institutions, such
as commissions and different kinds of gatherings and assemblies. Submitting complaints
was also an important feature of the local political culture. As a whole, the peasants
were highly organized. In particular, trips to Stockholm required a great deal of
planning and organization, as has been observed in previous studies.91 In addition,
regional co-operation was extensive, as the peasant leaders collaborated with their
peers in Karelia.
Overall, peasant unrest in Ingria bore major similarities with the riots in Kexholm
County.92 Since both regions were unruly borderlands, the political culture comprised
more elements of threat and violence, especially as domestic discipline was strict.
Peasants, in turn, consistently took advantage of the permeable borders and were able
to decrease the risks of illegal resistance by means of escaping to another region. In
fact, borders were one of the most effective political weapons for the peasants.
Desertion was not only a way to escape in difficult situations, but also a latent threat
that the peasants employed to keep the taxes and duties at a bearable level.
Peasant unrest in Ingria was directly caused by the problems connected with the
manorial economy. The non-fixed rent, the obligation to provide statute labour and
the arbitrariness of the manorial officials especially irritated the peasants. Even though
one of the objectives of Swedish provincial policy was to improve the position of
peasants,93 the Crown was not strong enough to replace the manorial economy and the
system of privatized tax collection with an administration overseen by Crown officials.
The system of tax collection in Ingria remained unstable because the peasants did not
regard tax farming as a legitimate form of taxation. Indirectly, however, the aim of the
Swedish Crown to strengthen its military presence in the province through a policy of
centralization and unification can be seen as the fundamental reason behind the
conflicts. Thus, tax farming provided a clear link between peasant unrest and state
formation. The reduction, tax farming, and peasant unrest all contributed to the same
array of problems, as Kimmo Katajala has suggested.94
Commercial development
The position and significance of Ingria in the Swedish Kingdom can also be examined
through the development of commerce and trade in the last decades of Swedish rule in
Ingria. The commercial policy was one way for the Crown to strengthen Ingria fiscally,
but it had consequences for the whole eastern part of the Baltic. How did the central
government try to intervene with commercial development? What was the relationship
between the military and trade objectives of the Swedish Crown?
For Sweden, control of the Baltic Sea was one of the most important objectives
during its so-called Age of Greatness. Sweden’s central government tried to steer the
transit trade between Russia and western Europe through the Ingrian towns of Nyen
and Narva, and away from the trading routes of Archangelsk and the White Sea. This
economic programme, called the Derivation policy, was a programme planned by
Gustavus Adolphus and Axel Oxenstierna.95
The cities of Narva and Nyen were key to the success of the Derivation policy. The
Swedish Crown had high expectations for the development of these towns. Both Narva
and Nyen were situated in excellent locations for trading purposes. For instance, in
1664 Counsellor Lorentz Creutz emphasized the ideal situation of Nyen because,
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according to him, there was no other town or port in the realm better situated for the
Russian trade.96 The broad hinterland of Nyen extended all the way to Karelia and
north-western Russia. Overall, both Narva and Nyen were ethnically and linguistically
quite heterogeneous, like Ingria in general. In both towns, however, the most power-
ful burghers came from a German or Baltic-German background.97
The commercial aims of the Crown were partly fulfilled in the late 17th century. The
central government tried to improve the conditions for trade through different kinds of tax
and customs relief measures. Actually, the eastern part of the Baltic evolved into a free
trade zone, as Nyen, Narva, and Reval constituted a common customs region with low
customs tariffs. At the same time, there was a great demand for timber and other
shipbuilding material (naval stores) in western Europe. Additionally, Sweden made some
agreements and treaties both with Russia and the Netherlands during these years.98
The burghers of Narva and Nyen had close contact particularly with the
Netherlands. With the help of Dutch capital and professionals, new fine-blade sawmills
and shipyards were established along the Narva and Neva rivers to make more timber
available for shipment to the Netherlands. Consequently, timber exports and shipbuild-
ing greatly increased, particularly in the 1690s.99 According to the Sound Toll Registers,
some 80 ships from Narva and 30 ships from Nyen sailed yearly through the Sound
between 1681 and 1703. They were loaded with shipbuilding material and sailed mostly
to Amsterdam, but also to England. Compared to other towns around the Gulf of
Finland, approximately 40 ships sailed yearly from Reval during the same period, while
only a dozen left the harbour of Viborg.100 In addition, ships also sailed to other Baltic
ports, particularly to Stockholm and Lübeck. In Nyen, roughly half of the ships that
yearly left the port were Russian vessels (lodja) coming from Novgorod and other parts
of north-western Russia, underscoring the pivotal role of Nyen in transit trade.101
Sweden’s unification policy in Ingria in the 1670s and 1680s also affected the
towns. Nyen and especially Narva had a relatively strong German character as they
were dominated by burgers of German or Baltic-German descent. To decrease the
German influence, a ‘Swedification’ policy was implemented. Half of the city court
judges (Sw. rådman) were supposed to be Swedes, and the Swedish language was
supposed to be used during court sessions.102 The policy could be reinforced because
both towns followed Swedish city law. In addition, Nyen had been founded on the
Crown’s initiative and thus had no old privileges.103
Narva and Nyen were thus judicially integrated Swedish towns and more or less
administrated like other towns in Sweden and Finland. However, the Crown implemented
a common commercial policy based on the Russian transit trade in Ingria and the Baltic
provinces. In addition, the burghers were not represented in the Swedish Diet.104 With
respect to commerce and city administration, Ingria was partly integrated into the actual
realm, but, at the same time, governed by methods typical for the eastern Baltic provinces.
The strategic position of Narva and Nyen for trade and military purposes was equally
important, as they represented different sides of the same coin. This was clearly evident
in a resolution made by Charles XI in 1679. The fortress of Nyenskans was to be
strengthened in order to secure the kingdom, but also to increase trade.105 The military
presence secured the preconditions for trade. At the same time, strong and wealthy
burghers benefited the Crown, for example by generating customs incomes and provid-
ing possibilities to loan money in times of crisis. Overall, military and economic factors
were intertwined, like in many commercially important border cities.
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The position of Ingria
Ingria was of pivotal military importance for Sweden as a buffer zone against Russia. The
Ingrian fortresses were supposed to protect Finland as well as the Baltic provinces from a
Russian attack. Consequently, the income that the state gained from the reduction and
from initiating tax farming was almost entirely invested in Ingrian fortresses. A strong
military presence was also essential for securing the preconditions for trade.
Clearly, the actions of the Ingrian peasants had consequences in terms of how state
power was manifested at the local level. In Ingria, their contribution led to modifica-
tions of the taxation system and also affected the way in which tax farming was
regulated and helped moderate the state’s religious policy. This supports the findings of
Harald Gustafsson, who has claimed that competition between states was the main
driving force in the state-building process, but that it was ‘common people’ who
shaped such competition.106 In addition to staging protests, the peasants also partici-
pated in non-institutional negotiations with the authorities. Hence, the Ingrian peasants
were extended political power.107 Negotiations were important for the legitimacy of
the Crown, while they gave the peasants a chance to speak up, particularly since they
lacked representation in the Swedish Diet. Even though the state dominated the
negotiations, the ‘common people’ certainly played a role in the process.
The Crown needed resources to maintain and improve its military power, but it was
done in continuous negotiation with the subjects of the king. Therefore, the Swedish
state can be described as a bargaining military state (Sw. förhandlande militärstat). Unlike
the traditional view of the state-building process, it was expressly the peasantry who
challenged the intentions of the central government in Ingria, instead of the local elite.
The Ingrian nobility did oppose some of the central government’s actions, but it was
particularly the mobility of the local peasants that posed problems for the authorities. In
this respect, Ingria can be characterized as an unruly borderland.
In the 1670s and 1680s, the Crown attempted to integrate Ingria more closely into the
realm. Uniformity was sought both in terms of administration and the judicial system, as well
as at a cultural level. Still, the main goal was to strengthen the province militarily and fiscally.
It was important that Ingria should be financially self-sufficient. The Crown was nevertheless
not strong enough to carry out a coherent integration process, which is clearly demonstrated
by the initiation of tax farming.108 Thus, Ingria was still treated as a province; but in another
respect, it occupied a continuously changing position between the actual realm and the
provinces. The intermediary position of Ingria appears, for example, in regard to commerce
and the administration of the Ingrian towns. Both Narva and Nyen followed Swedish city law,
but they were not controlled as closely as towns in the core areas of the realm. The position
of Ingria as a link between the core areas of Sweden and the Baltic provinces is also quite
visible with respect to the manorial economy, in which Swedish law collided with the
‘Livonian practice’ of exercising domestic discipline.
Previous studies have treated Sweden as a representative example of a power state. In
Ingria, the Crown succeeded in increasing revenues, mostly through the reduction and tax
farming. In addition, authorities managed to resolve the turbulent situation existing in the
mid-1680s. However, the Swedish Kingdom also exhibited certain symptoms of a powerless
state on its periphery. The successful integration of the Orthodox peasants into the realm
remained an unresolved issue. First and foremost, authorities faced constant difficulties in
controlling the peasants, particularly because of their great mobility and use of borders.
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